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course no question that scientific evidence can be relevant to evaluating
philosophical theories, but its indispensability is another matter. He poses a level-
headed challenge to naturalists, to provide an example in which empirical evi-
dence is both scientific and indispensable for evaluating philosophical theories.
In his concluding chapter, Daly sketches a defence of the view that philosophi-
cal theories are justified (or not) on the basis of how well they balance costs and
benefits. He notes that many worries about the cost-benefit method are mis-
placed. It might appear that the method is at root pragmatist, because it might
seem to require us to prefer theories which are simpler or more fruitful, etc. But
in fact the method itself contains no presupposition that simplicity or fruitfulness
are legitimate theoretical benefits, or that they have more weight than, say, some
deeply entrenched intuition. Or one might think the method has a suspicious
record. Is it not used to justify concrete possible worlds? Here again the quarrel is
not with the method but with particular weightings of putative costs and benefits.
The method itself by no means commits one to modal realism. There is no pre-
tence that following this method will somehow make philosophical theory selec-
tion a simple matter. But that at least stays true to actual practice. It would be
na¨ve to think that finding the answers would be easy if only we were doing phi-
losophy right.
Daly’s book is full of good philosophical judgement. Whatever the criteria for
good philosophy are, there is no doubt Daly has met them. His book is an excel-
lent starting place for both students interested in philosophy and professionals
interested in philosophical methodology.
PAUL AUDIUniversity of Nebraska at Omaha
Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. BY CRAWFORD L. ELDER. (Cambridge UP, 2011.
Pp. xi + 210. Price £50.00, $85.00 h/b.)
In this new book, Elder moves against the prevailing ontological wind, defending
familiar object realism – the thesis that many of the objects recognised by com-
mon sense are mind-independently real. This is a daunting task, but Elder has
risen to the challenge here: this is an impressively articulated counter-offensive
against positions which reject realist, ‘common-sense’ ontology.
Elder first focuses upon two ‘false friends’, positions which appear conducive to
familiar object realism but are secretly opposed. He first attacks ‘modal conven-
tionalism’ – according to which kind-sameness and persistence judgements are
true because they are analytic – and explosivism – according to which every way
of carving up the world tracks real persistence and kind-sameness. Elder argues
(ch. 1) that real kind-sameness and persistence judgments are Millikan-style
pushmipullyu representations and therefore they essentially involve imperative
and indicative aspects, which explosivism and modal conventionalism respectively
fail to account for.
A subsequent target is ontological relativism, according to which our ontologi-
cal judgments are true in virtue of our conceptual scheme. Finding it unfavour-
able to familiar object realism, Elder argues (ch. 2) that the properties which
BOOK REVIEWS 195
© 2011 The Authors The Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
nonstandard, alternative conceptual schemes rely upon do not fall into contrary
ranges, which prevents those who employ them from successfully tracking causa-
tion. As such, alternative conceptual schemes cannot be as empirically successful
as schemes which are realist and focus upon familiar objects – a happy result for
Elder’s brand of realism.
Elder proceeds (ch. 3) to show that his empirically adequate familiar object
realism requires commitment to the idea that the natural kind an object instanti-
ates determines the persistence conditions of the object. He blocks apparent
examples of objects surviving changing their kind by ingeniously distinguishing
between genuine and ‘imposter’ natural kinds via their essential properties: the
properties essential to genuine natural kinds causally control other properties had
by the object, unlike for imposters.
Having secured a foundation for familiar object realism, the next four chapters
target realist ontologies which ‘explain away’ the familiar. The first is exduran-
tism, which reduces enduring familiar objects to sequences of instantaneous
temporal stages linked by temporal-counterpart relations. Elder argues that if ex-
durantism isn’t going to collapse into explosivism it must explain why we
privilege those collections of temporal stages which ‘common sense and empirical
science attribute to familiar objects’ (p. 81). The only viable exdurantist explana-
tion – postulating ‘non-supervenient’ relations – is less theoretically virtuous than
postulating enduring, familiar objects.
The second of the attempts to ‘explain away’ the familiar are causal exclu-
sion arguments (ch. 5). Causation at the familiar, macro-level is in competition
with causation at the micro-level. To avoid over-determination, we deny
macro causation; via Alexander’s dictum we thereby deny existence to the
macro.
Elder argues there is a causal connection between two events iff there is an
invariance – a function such that, by varying the value of the cause variable Vc,
one can manipulate the effect variable Ve. According to Elder, a necessary condi-
tion for there being an invariance between two events is that there is a context-
invariant similarity ordering for the variants of the events involved. However,
because there is ‘systematic interference’ among the various dimensions of differ-
ence along which micro-level events can vary, there cannot be such an ordering.
There is therefore no micro-level causal relation, no over-determination, and no
exclusion.
While it would be nice to have a good response to causal exclusion, Elder’s
argument is too strong. Take the causal relation between the events my watching
Casablanca and my being emotional. There are many ways we could vary the for-
mer: colourise the film, dub the dialogue, add subtitles, double the viewing
screen, remove some popcorn, etc. No context-invariant similarity ordering holds
across all these dimensions of difference. Therefore there is no causal link here –
so much for heart-wrenching movies (or macro-causation in general). One could,
to block this objection, contextualise similarity along some specifiable dimension
of difference, but only at the cost of blocking Elder’s argument too. Thus Elder
196 BOOK REVIEWS
© 2011 The Authors The Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
seems stuck: demand context-invariant similarity and lose macro causation or
contextualise similarity and lose the objection to exclusion.
The third way of explaining away familiar objects is to reduce them to com-
plex arrangements of mereological simples – e.g. replace Fido with simples
arranged dog-wise. After arguing that it is impossible to specify which simples are
included in the dog-wise arrangements without appealing to the ontological
‘shadows’ of the emerging familiar objects themselves (ch. 6), Elder attempts to
dismiss causal competition arguments in favour of mereological reduction. He
offers a modified version of his objection to causal exclusion arguments; a suitably
modified version of my above counter applies here as well.
Rounding off the attempts at explaining the familiar away and returning to
the theme of false-friends (ch. 7), Elder proceeds to universal mereological compo-
sition (UMC), according to which familiar objects exist due to the mere existence
of their parts – Fido is, in effect, an ontological ‘free lunch’, emerging from the
existence and arrangement of all the ‘Fido parts’. Elder argues the ‘structural’
properties which characterise typical UMC objects are not genuine properties.
Genuine properties essentially contrast, ‘sharply or mildly, with certain other
properties’ (p. 154). Further, ‘contrariety obtains only where a property differs
from other properties to greater and lesser, but commensurable degrees: there
must be a well-defined phenomenon of “more or less different from”‘ (p.159).
UMC structural properties fail to satisfy this condition.
If this condition held, every property would have to be scalar instead of binary
— i.e. like being 6′ tall instead of being a duck. This just isn’t the case. In particular,
natural kind properties don’t appear to have ranges of properties which they con-
trast with to greater or lesser degrees. Given Elder’s condition, they therefore
aren’t genuine properties. How do we square this with the result that an empiri-
cally adequate realism about familiar objects requires natural kind properties for
determining persistence conditions? Again, Elder seems stuck.
The final chapter is a Hegelian argument for the contrariety condition for gen-
uine properties. The central claim is that, ‘to assert that red obtains is meaningful
just because that assertion rules out an occurrence of brown or of green; an asser-
tion that cold obtains rules out an occurrence of hot and of tepid.’ (p. 171) So, as
with cold and red (both fundamentally phenomenal properties), so for duck and dog.
The problem with such a conclusion is that ducks, unlike degrees, aren’t additive.
It does not make sense to say that Donald is three times more ducky than
Bullwinkle, though it does to say that Bullwinkle is 20 cooler. To hold that all
properties must be fundamentally scalar seems to impoverish the ontology of
properties to a degree that renders the notion useless.
A brief but compelling appendix detailing the possibility of mutually interfering
dimensions of difference concludes the book.
Despite the worries that I have expressed here, this is an interesting, argu-
ment-filled book. Anyone interested in ontology, and in particular the ontology of
the familiar, would do well to read it.
NATHAN WILDMANSidney Sussex & Queens’ Colleges, University of Cambridge
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